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Abstract
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act inspired research on long-term
high-integrity retention of business records, based on the
long-term immutability guarantees that WORM storage
servers offer for files. Researchers recently proposed a
Log-compliant DBMS Architecture (LDA) that extends
those immutability guarantees to relational tuples, using
an approach that imposes a 10-20% performance penalty
on TPC-C benchmark runs.
In this paper, we present the transaction log on WORM
(TLOW) approach for supporting long-term immutabil-
ity for relational tuples. TLOW incurs less than 1% run-
time overhead on TPC-C benchmarks with Berkeley DB,
which is much less than for LDA. TLOW requires no
changes to the DBMS kernel, and audit time is compa-
rable to that of LDA: 2.7% of transaction time, i.e. ten
days for a yearly audit on the platform we used. We also
introduce the audit helper (AH) add-on to TLOW, which
decreases the cost of a yearly audit on our platform to
two hours. We provide a proof of correctness for TLOW,
which exposes a subtle threat. The proof also illustrates
a non-obvious problem with LDA, which we show how
to correct.
1 Introduction
The drumbeat of financial accounting scandals, from
ENRON in 2000 to Satyam Infotech in 2008, has
prompted the introduction of regulations intended to
guarantee the integrity of business records. For exam-
ple, Wall Street firms are subject to Securities and Ex-
change Commission Rule 17a-4, and all medium and
large US public companies are subject to the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act. These two regulations are intended to en-
sure the preservation of immutable copies of all business
email, spreadsheets, instant messages, and reports during
a multi-year mandatory retention period. The penalties
for non-compliance include hefty fines and potential jail
terms.
To help companies comply with these regulations,
all major storage vendors (IBM, EMC, NetApp, HP,
Sony, Toshiba, and more) sell so-called WORM storage
servers, providing a version of write-once-read-many se-
mantics for storing files. On such devices, files are term-
immutable; that is, once they are committed to the de-
vice, they are read-only for the duration of a predeclared
retention period. The WORM semantics imply that dur-
ing its retention period, not even an insider with system
administrator privileges can delete or alter a file. To help
ensure that WORM storage servers are trustworthy, they
run their own file server code and no user programs;
they offer a narrow interface for users and administra-
tors that returns an error message to file system requests
that would violate term-immutability. WORM storage
servers also have special backup facilities and clocks, to
help prevent attacks that target those facilities. Some
products also support eradication of files at the end of
their retention periods and can enforce “litigation holds”
to ensure that subpoenaed files are not destroyed.
Because they support term-immutability at the file
level, WORM storage servers are not directly useful for
providing term-immutability for fine-grained data such
as database tuples. Researchers have noted that it is im-
practical to provide term-immutability by making every
tuple a separate file, making a new copy of the database
file on every update, or moving the DBMS functionality
into the WORM storage server [16]. A DBMS that sup-
ports term-immutability must consist of untrusted code
that communicates with the (trusted) WORM storage
server over as narrow an interface as possible.
Recently, researchers have proposed a scheme for
supporting term-immutability in databases [16]. Their
approach, called the log-consistent DBMS architecture
(LDA), turns every tuple insert, delete, and update re-
quest into the creation of a new version of the tuple. LDA
stores a DB snapshot on WORM at audit time, then uses
an additional log stored on WORM to record database
modifications. LDA uses the log and snapshot at the next
audit to check for tampered content in the current DB
state. LDA has a small window of vulnerability (e.g.,
5 minutes) between the time that a transaction commits
and when its writes become term-immutable. Depend-
ing on the implementation, LDA requires small changes
in the DBMS kernel, or none at all. LDA imposes 10-
20% overhead in transaction throughput for TPC-C and,
as discussed in Section 7, audits are slow.
In this paper, we propose a much more efficient archi-
tecture for supporting term-immutable relational tuples.
Our transaction log on WORM (TLOW) architecture pro-
vides term-immutability for tuples with no changes to the
DBMS kernel. Our main contributions are: (1) we pro-
vide a proof of correctness for TLOW, which illustrates
subtle points concerning windows of vulnerability after
a transaction commits, together with a small correctness
problem with LDA that we show how to fix; (2) we use
the TPC-C benchmark to show that TLOW imposes less
than 1% overhead in transaction throughput; and (3) we
introduce an audit helper (AH) add-on that reduces the
cost of a yearly audit to just two hours on the platform we
used, rather than the several days required for an LDA
audit.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: we dis-
cuss the threat model for long-term retention of data in
compliance with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and SEC Rule
17a-4 in Section 2. We present the TLOW architecture
and its AH audit helper in Sections 3 and 5, with a proof
of correctness for TLOW in Section 4. We discuss foren-
sic analysis in Section 6, provide experimental results in
Section 7, discuss related work in Section 8, and con-
clude in Section 9.
2 Threat Model
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Figure 1: Threat model parameters. The regret interval
is the minimum time interval between when a tuple is
committed and when someone may wish to tamper with
it. The query validation interval is the time gap between
querying and validation of the query results.
Primary threat: forgery of history. We use the
regret-based threat model for databases, as introduced in
[16]. This threat model captures the way that falsifica-
tion of historical records typically happens in the situa-
tions targeted by Sarbanes-Oxley and SEC Rule 17a-4.
These regulations require the presence and enforcement
of policies and procedures outside the DBMS to ensure
that routine business records (email, financial transac-
tions, and so) are captured at the time they are generated,
and untampered software is used to process them. Once
records are captured, the threat is that an adversary such
as a bribed superuser will eventually regret the existence
of one of these records, and alter or delete it. An adver-
sary may also try to insert a backdated record. For exam-
ple, an executive might request the insertion of phony
backdated product orders, or retroactively change the
quantities on existing product orders, to increase sales
totals for the previous quarter. Our task is to foil these
attacks when possible, and to ensure that such tamper-
ing can be detected when it does occur. When tamper-
ing is detected at an audit, regulations require the com-
pany to launch an investigation, with potential prosecu-
tion for those responsible for the tampering; thus adver-
saries want to perform undetectable tampering.
How to forge history. To forge history, an adversary
Mala can tamper with the database file and/or log files
(up to the limits, if any, imposed by the servers where
the files reside). Since Mala may be a system admin-
istrator, she may be able to assume any user’s identity
and read, overwrite, append to, or delete any file, includ-
ing database data, indexes, logs, and metadata, up to the
limits imposed by the storage server where the files re-
side. She can change the database’s contents with a file
editor, or by using a non-compliant DBMS to overwrite
the contents of the database. She can crash the DBMS
or storage server. She can tamper with the execution en-
vironment, such as by tampering with the clock on the
DBMS or storage server (within limits discussed below),
and change any other environmental parameters.
Since Mala can take on anyone’s identity, in theory she
can successfully impersonate the DBMS when talking
to a storage server, and issue any command during her
impersonation. We assume that the DBMS and storage
server prevent such attacks on the transaction log, while
the DBMS is up. For example, they may use some combi-
nation of TPMs, mutual authentication, a secure commu-
nication channel, and non-advisory locking on the stor-
age server side, so that only the DBMS can write to the
transaction log while the DBMS is up. 1 We call this
property transaction integrity; without it, Mala can ap-
pend arbitrary material to the transaction log while the
DBMS is running, so that the log contents no longer
1Alternatively, the DBMS might occasionally sign the log files that
it has written, using a key that Mala cannot obtain. But for reasons that
will become clear later, we prefer a solution approach that does not
require scanning the transaction log.
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faithfully mirror the intent of the executing transactions.
Such attacks are not part of our threat model per se, as
they cannot be used to forge history, but they are clearly
undesirable in any enterprise, and they muddy the ques-
tion of what a “correct” final state is. While the DBMS
is down, Mala can append arbitrary material to the trans-
action log that refers to transactions active at the time of
the crash, or to new transactions.
We assume that Mala cannot tamper with data while
it resides in the DBMS page cache. Page cache attacks
can be prevented by kernel patches that keep processes,
even those owned by root, from getting read-write ac-
cess to other processes’ memory [1]. The only way to
bypass such patches is to replace the kernel and reboot
the DBMS server machine, which is hard to carry out
without being detected by an audit. Thus we assume that
when a new transaction arrives at the DBMS (even one
submitted by Mala), the DBMS correctly executes it.
We assume that Mala does not block, alter, or signif-
icantly delay the messages sent between the DBMS and
the storage servers, for the following reasons. First, we
assume that Mala does not want to interfere with the
ordinary, non-threatening transactions being processed
by the DBMS, so she does not have a motive to block
those packets. Second, as discussed below, we assume a
nonzero regret interval at the DBMS level. This implies
that Mala will not decide to delay packets for a regret in-
terval, and then inspect them to see if she objects to their
contents. Overall, the effect of these limits on Mala’s
tampering is that DBMS transactions that insert new tu-
ples will be able to insert them and commit normally.
We assume negligible delays in communication be-
tween the DBMS and storage servers and in performing
simple writes to storage, such as the appending of a new
block to a log. In practice, a short delay (e.g., a second or
less) is unlikely to cause a problem; but a lengthy delay
will look like a DBMS crash to auditors, who will expect
to find certain crash-specific information on the storage.
If in fact no crash occurred, the absence of that informa-
tion will look like a tampering attempt to the auditor.
Threats other than history forgery. In addition to
history forgery attempts, the DBMS and storage servers
are subject to all the traditional threats of ordinary life,
and measures must be taken to deal with those as well.
For example, the storage server must be backed up regu-
larly. Mala can launch a denial-of-service attack against
the DBMS. Mala can create any new applications that she
likes, under any user identity, and these applications can
submit transactions to the DBMS, which will faithfully
execute them. For example, Mala might inappropriately
alter the current state of the database, by giving herself
a big raise. She can vandalize the database state and/or
logs in an easily detectable manner, launch a cross-site
scripting attack against the database, or tamper with the
DBMS or application software. More generally, compli-
ance is a many-layered endeavor: every layer of the sys-
tem needs to have its own safeguards to protect against
attacks at that level. Sarbanes-Oxley auditors require
a risk-management-based approach to guarding against
these attacks, and we assume that policies and proce-
dures are in place for that purpose. For example, to ad-
dress the problem of tampering with DBMS and applica-
tion software, one can check signatures on the hashes of
the executables [5, 23]. (Tampering with major software
applications is difficult anyway, because source code is
usually not available.) Controls and techniques outside
the scope of this paper are needed to help guard against,
detect, analyze, and clean up after these traditional at-
tacks.
Trusted source of information about crashes. We
assume that an auditor has a trustworthy source of in-
formation about the time at the WORM server that each
crash or shutdown occurred since the previous audit, and
the time that normal transaction processing began or re-
sumed. We believe that this assumption is reasonable be-
cause the crash of a production system will be a visible
inconvenience at the application layer, and applications
can note the relevant times in an error log on WORM.
The auditor does not need to know the times of crashes
that occur during crash recovery; this is important, since
such crashes are not easily observable at the application
layer.
The regret interval. As shown in Figure 1, at some
point an adversary starts to regret the current database
state and wishes to tamper with it. The regret interval
is the minimum time interval we can assume between
when a tuple is committed to the database and an ad-
versary tries to tamper with it. For post-hoc insertion of
tuples, the regret interval is the minimum time interval
we can assume between when a tuple was not commit-
ted to the database and when an adversary tries to insert
it with a backdated start time. In current legal interpre-
tations of email compliance, the regret interval is zero,
meaning that email must be archived on WORM before
it is delivered to its recipient. The architects of LDA ar-
gued that to ensure good DBMS performance, we need a
non-zero regret interval [16]. Current practice in indus-
try is to dump a snapshot of the database contents and
current log files to WORM periodically, making the re-
gret interval at least a day long. Thus, a regret interval of
a few seconds or minutes at the DBMS level represents a
significant advance over current industrial practice.
Although the DBMS regret interval will be non-zero,
the application level may be able to enforce a zero re-
gret interval, e.g., by sending all arriving invoices to
WORM storage before entering them into the company’s
accounting system.
The query verification interval. The LDA authors
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also introduced the concept of a query verification inter-
val, which is the interval between the time a transaction
reads data and the time when we determine whether that
data had been tampered with. For example, Mala may
use a file editor to overwrite her salary in the DB, dou-
bling it right before a legitimate application gives every
employee a 10% raise. Then she can untamper the old
version of the tuple, leaving the new version in place
with its incorrect salary. Under LDA, the query verifi-
cation window is always the time until the next audit.
The effects of Mala’s tampering may have spread far and
wide before the next yearly audit, and LDA audits are so
expensive that it is impractical to audit frequently. In this
paper, we introduce techniques for high-performance au-
diting, which in turn make frequent informal audits prac-
tical.
Leveraging WORM storage servers. Companies
rely on WORM storage servers to counter the threat of
history forgery. While not completely tamperproof when
faced with a determined and skilled system administrator
with a screwdriver and physical access to the server, the
servers do raise the bar quite high for tampering. Fur-
ther, they cost approximately the same amount as ordi-
nary storage servers, which is very important: the high
cost of retaining all business records for (in most cases)
seven years in a tamper-evident manner must be bal-
anced against the benefit to society of increased accu-
racy in financial reporting and accountability for inac-
curate financial reporting. Thus in this work, we also
leverage WORM storage servers as our trusted comput-
ing base. We do require one extension to current inter-
faces, namely, the ability to append to term-immutable
files in a particular directory or volume, from the time
that they are created until the first time they are closed.
After the first closure, the file is read-only for the remain-
der of its retention period. This simple extension makes
it possible to append to a log file, while the older part of
the same file is already term-immutable.
We do trust that the WORM server operates properly.
Mala can log in as root on the WORM server, and per-
form any action permitted to her there, but no action of
hers will cause the WORM server to overwrite or delete
unexpired files or to append to non-appendable files.
We trust that Mala cannot overcome the anti-tampering
provisions of WORM server clocks (e.g., SnapLock’s
“Compliance Clock, a secure time mechanism”). We ex-
ploit our trust in the WORM server’s clock, to provide
a reality check on the commit time timestamps produced
by the DBMS server. In particular, we require the DBMS
and WORM storage servers to keep their clocks roughly
synchronized, by limiting their drift to less than r/2 time
units at all times, where r is the length of the regret in-
terval.
Leveraging transaction-time databases. An auditor
must be able to distinguish between data tampering and
legitimate modifications. For this reason, we retain all
versions of a database tuple, using a layer of software
above the DBMS that turns it into a transaction-time
database [9, 12, 13, 19, 22]. In general, a transaction-
time DBMS translates every tuple insertion, deletion, or
modification into the insertion of a new version of the
tuple, which is placed on the same page as the old tu-
ple if possible. Unknown to legacy applications, each
tuple has a start time attribute (or the equivalent), giving
the commit time of the transaction that inserted the tu-
ple. Deleted tuples are identified by a special end-of-life
version, whose start time is the commit time of the trans-
action that deleted the tuple. Legacy applications can
run on a transaction-time database with no changes, and
see only the most recent version of each undeleted tuple.
As needed, other applications can view past states of the
database by including an extra clause in their queries, us-
ing standard temporal SQL constructs.
For a transaction-time database, the threats described
above take the form of insertion of tuples with start times
that already have passed, removal of tuples that have not
yet expired, overwrites of existing versions of tuples, and
updates to deleted tuples or tuple versions that are not the
most recent.
3 The Transaction Log on WORM
(TLOW) DB Architecture
In designing a new architecture for supporting term-
immutable tuples, our design goals were to preserve
transaction throughput, minimize space overhead, avoid
changes to the DBMS kernel, and make audits as fast
as possible. The resulting Transaction Log on WORM
(TLOW) DB architecture runs a transaction-time layer
atop an ordinary DBMS. As shown in Figure 2(a),
TLOW stores the current DB instance on ordinary stor-
age and the transaction log on WORM storage. DBMSs
already contain a function that can be called periodi-
cally to flush the current transaction log to disk, close
its file, and open a new log file. For a regret interval of
r time units (e.g., 1 minute), the DBMS must perform
this operation once every r/2 time units. Depending on
the DBMS, this can be accomplished by tuning the ap-
propriate parameter, or by having a small application on
the DBMS server platform that sleeps for r/2 time units,
makes the call, and goes back to sleep.
Intuitively, it seems that TLOW DBs should have
a zero regret interval: once the transaction log is on
WORM, subsequent audits should work correctly. The
proof of Theorem 4.1 shows that this is incorrect, unless
the WORM and DBMS servers have perfectly synchro-
nized clocks. The periodic creation of a new log file is
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storage, along with a snapshot of the database contents as of the last audit. The current database contents are kept on
ordinary storage. (b) The auditor uses L and the old snapshot to validate the current database state, then creates a new
snapshot and discards the old one.
necessary for detecting clock tampering attacks on the
DBMS server that can compromise the next audit.
Legacy applications can run on a TLOW DB with no
changes whatsoever. All traditional SQL statements will
work correctly, including deletions. New time-aware ap-
plications can query past states of the database by includ-
ing an additional clause at the end of their SQL queries,
describing the time point at which the queries should be
run.
As shown in Figure 2(b), at the end of a successful au-
dit, the auditor writes a snapshot of the current database
state and a cryptographic hash of its contents to WORM
storage, and signs them. The old transaction logs can
be discarded at that point. For the next audit, the auditor
checks the signature on the hash of the previous snapshot
and generates new hashes from the current instance and
from the log. Intuitively, the audit succeeds if the hash
from the old DB snapshot Do, plus the hash of all the
new tuples introduced in the transaction log L, is equal
to the hash of the current instance Dc. Slightly abusing
notation, we can write this as the following tuple com-
pleteness condition: [16]
H(Dc) = H(Do) ∪ H(L)
As does LDA, we use a cryptographically strong in-
cremental hash function for sets that has the following
properties.
• Input: The hash function H operates on a set
{a1, . . . , an}.
• Incremental: Given an and H({a1, . . . , an−1}),
one can efficiently compute H({a1, . . . , an}).
• Commutative: The value of H is independent of
the order of the items in the set.
• Cryptographically Secure (Pre-image Resistant):
Given a set {a1, . . . , an}, one cannot efficiently find
{b1, . . . , bm} ( 6= {a1, . . . , an}) such that
H({a1, . . . , an}) = H({b1, . . . , bm}).
In our implementation, we used the ADD HASH func-
tion proposed by Bellare and Micciancio [4]:
ADD HASH(a1, . . . , an) =
∑
1≤i≤n
h(a1),
where h is a big (512 bits or more) secure one-way hash
function and the sum is taken modulo a large number.
Using such a hash function, the auditor can incremen-
tally compute a hash over Do ∪ L and Dc. Pre-image
resistance ensures that H(Do ∪L) = H(Dc) if and only
if Ds ∪ L = Dc. Each hash operation takes O(1) time.
The completeness check requires a single pass over Dc
and L, plus a read of the signed hash of the previous
snapshot. The total auditing cost, including the time to
write out the new signed snapshot and signed hash, is
O(|Dc| + |L|). This asymptotic complexity is the same
as for LDA, but we will show how to reduce the audit
cost below that of LDA by a factor of 100.
A state reversion attack occurs if Mala tampers with
the values in the database, causing transactions to read
incorrect data (and then possibly write incorrect data
based on what they read), and then untampers the data
before the next audit. Mala’s salary-doubling tam-
per/untamper example in Section 2 is a state reversion
attack; note that the tuple completeness check will not
detect that her final salary value is incorrect. One so-
lution to the state reversion attack is to adopt the hash-
page-on-read approach originally proposed (for slightly
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different purposes) for LDA [16]; in essence, the DBMS
logs a hash of the tuples on each data page read, and the
auditor reconstructs the content that should have been on
that page at that point, and computes its hash. This task is
hard because a page that is read may contain timestamps
instead of transaction IDs (explained below), and vice
versa; may contain tuples from transactions that subse-
quently abort; and may split in two before the next audit.
This approach is also expensive, imposing an approxi-
mate 10% overhead on TPC-C processing on the plat-
form where we ran our experiments, plus over a day of
audit time each year. While the audit helper approach
presented in Section 5 can be used to shrink the audit
costs to an acceptable level, the 10% TPC-C overhead
remains. While moving the hashing functionality to the
DBMS kernel can reduce the cost to perhaps 8%, we pre-
fer not to complicate the kernel with a new task if possi-
ble.
The major question is whether the cost of perfect de-
tection of state reversion attacks in public companies and
Wall Street firms is worth the benefit it will bring to soci-
ety in detecting and deterring fraud. With the suspicion
that it is not, we propose a lower-cost probabilistic alter-
native that leverages the use of frequent internal audits,
which in turn are made possible by our new audit tech-
niques that run much faster. The key idea is that any state
reversion attack that is underway will be detected by a
tuple completeness check. If tuple completeness checks
are performed frequently, e.g., as part of a daily backup
process, we will detect most state reversion attacks, be-
cause most tampering needs to persist for a significant
amount of time to be effective. For example, a phony
backdated purchase order will need to be left in place
for an extended period of time, so that it shows up in all
accounting runs for that fiscal period.2
This approach will not detect any state reversion at-
tacks that are launched and completed before the next
tuple completeness check. For example, if Mala doubles
and then reverts her salary, all on the day that raises are
given out, we will probably not detect her attack. Note
also that a state reversion attack can only be carried out
by a highly skilled user such as a DBA who can overwrite
the DB state by invoking a non-compliant copy of the
DBMS, or using a file editor. If this user is also in charge
of the informal audit, then she has a conflict of inter-
est. Separation-of-duty constraints should be employed
to ensure that reports of tampering from informal audits
will reach someone who is unlikely to be involved in car-
rying out a state reversion attack – though we can never
2We are referring to backdating that can be detected at the DBMS
level. Application-level backdating, such as an ordinary purchase order
insertion that gives a date in the previous fiscal quarter, can be detected
by an application-level audit that compares the DBMS commit times-
tamp on the purchase order tuples with the date given in the purchase
order tuples themselves.
rule out the possibility of collusion between Mala and
the report recipient. All in all, policy-makers must decide
whether this level of protection against state-reversion at-
tacks is sufficient, or society needs the higher-cost hash-
tuple-on-read approach.
In addition to checking tuple completeness and (if de-
sired) for state reversion attacks, the auditor must also
verify the integrity of all indexes, database pages, and
the transaction log, using the ordinary integrity-checking
utilities included with a commercial DBMS. This in-
cludes checking that the slot pointers on each page are
set up correctly, the tuples are in sorted order across the
pages (if that is required), the different versions of a tu-
ple are all threaded together in commit-time order (if the
DBMS uses version threading; our implementation does
not), and all other stored metadata is correct (the magic
number on the page, the count of tuples on the page, etc.).
The auditor must also check that all indexes are set up
properly and point to the appropriate tuples; otherwise, a
tuple can be hidden from queries by suitable manipula-
tions of the indexes.
For performance reasons, a transaction-time DB often
uses the transaction ID T as a temporary commit time
value in a tuple, and does a lazy update of the commit
time later [12, 13]. Once T has committed, the next time
that any page it wrote goes to disk, all occurrences of T ’s
transaction ID on that page will be replaced by T ’s times-
tamp. Since some pages that T wrote may already be on
disk when T commits, those pages will not have their
timestamps filled in until the next time they are read into
memory, which may occur much later. All must be filled
in by the next audit, or the audit will fail; if needed, they
can be filled in during the scan of the current instance
during audit. If a timestamp is not filled in before one
regret interval has passed, then Mala may wish to tam-
per with the timestamp, but we will prove that such an
attack is detected at the next audit. Lazy timestamping
may cause a tuple in L to contain a transaction ID rather
than a commit time.
A transaction T may overwrite the same tuple t several
times. For example, T may have several SQL statements
that all update t. In a transaction-time database, these
three updates result in only one new version of the tu-
ple, rather than three new versions. After each of these
writes, t’s dirty page may be sent back to disk when the
DBMS’s buffers fill up, only to be brought into memory
again. The auditor must hash only the final values written
by T .
TLOW assumes ARIES-style logging and recovery.
If transaction processing is interrupted by a crash, the
DBMS will not accept new transactions until crash re-
covery has finished. To recover from the crash, the
DBMS performs normal UNDO/REDO recovery. In
most implementations, this involves first redoing all
6
committed transactions (oldest first), then undoing all
uncommitted transactions (newest first). The final effect
is the same as if all transactions that had not yet commit-
ted at the time of the crash were aborted, and then trans-
action processing continued with the next transaction to
arrive. If a crash occurs during recovery, the DBMS
restarts recovery, as usual. Recovery must be completed
before the next audit starts. The only compliance-related
twist to recovery is that a new file for L must be cre-
ated at the beginning of crash recovery, and again when
the DBMS is restarted after normal shutdown or when it
starts to accept new transactions after crash recovery.
Auditor details. Pseudocode for all auditor activities
can be found at the end of the paper. The auditor’s work
begins with a variety of sanity checks on the contents
of the log files; we focus here on those associated with
crashes, which are described in the GlobalSanityCheck
routine. Let k be the time of the first crash or shutdown
that the auditor has not yet analyzed, and k′ be the time
when the DBMS starts accepting new transactions, taken
from her trusted list of such times. A log file is part of
the recovery log, written R, if its life span [create time,
last write time] falls entirely inside the interval [k, k′].
The auditor ignores all R files during the remainder of
the audit. We reserve the notation L for log files gen-
erated during normal transaction processing, outside of
recovery.
Tampering is indicated by any log file whose lifespan
partially overlaps [k, k′]. More precisely, any log file
whose last write time is after k and before k′ and contains
anything other than recovery-related information (e.g.,
CLRs) indicates tampering, as does any log file whose
create time is before k′ and whose last write time is af-
ter k′. For example, Mala may have appended additional
records to an existing log file after a crash. If any of
these conditions is violated, the audit fails, and forensic
analysis should be performed to clean up the state before
proceeding. We leave the design of forensic analysis rou-
tines to future work, along with their incorporation into
the recovery and audit processes. After the sanity checks
are complete, the auditor can continue on to the main
tasks of the audit, being sure to ignore allR files.
The auditor parses the log records in L to find all the
new tuples (more precisely, versions of tuples) inserted
by transactions. For each such tuple t, she extracts its
timestamp field ts. If ts is the timestamp of a transaction
whose COMMIT record she has already scanned, or that
committed before the last audit, then she ignores t. If
ts is a transaction ID or timestamp that she has not seen
before, she determines the corresponding transaction ID
tid. She starts a new data structure for tid and records
t’s key (exclusive of timestamp) and content there. If she
has seen ts before but not seen a corresponding COM-
MIT record, she adds t’s key k (exclusive of timestamp)
and content to the data structure for the tid correspond-
ing to ts, overwriting any previous content stored there
for k.
The auditor does not actually hash any of the new tu-
ples for T until she sees the COMMIT record for T ,
which records T ’s transaction ID tid and timestamp ts.
For recovery purposes, all of T ’s new tuples appear on
L before that COMMIT record. Thus at that point, the
auditor hashes all the new tuples she has recorded in the
data structure for tid, and then deletes the data structure
for tid. Once she has scanned past the COMMIT record
for T , the auditor ignores T ’s subsequent writes to t in L.
If these updates change t’s content (exclusive of times-
tamp), they are tampering attempts. If they only change
t’s timestamp, they are irrelevant because in her hash, the
auditor only uses the timestamp she found in the COM-
MIT record for T . The auditor never hashes new tuples
from transactions that abort; any tid data structures re-
maining at the end of her scan are for aborted transac-
tions. When the auditor finishes scanning one file of L,
she moves on to the next file (in create time order).
At the end of its retention period, a tuple version may
be shredded. We adopt the shredding approach proposed
for LDA [16], which we do not discuss further in this
paper.
4 Proof of Correctness for TLOW
Intuitively, two transaction-time databases are equivalent
if they contain the same tuple versions, up to shuffling
of timestamps. We must formalize this notion of “shuf-
fling”.
Definition The timestamp normal form of a
transaction-time DB is created by replacing all oc-
currences of the smallest timestamp in the entire DB by
0, the next smallest by 1, and so on.
The sequence of timestamps created during normaliza-
tion gives the serialization order of the transactions that
originally created the DB.
Definition Two transaction-time DBs are equivalent if
after timestamp normalization, both DBs contain the
same set of tuples.
There can be several different serial orders of a set of
transactions that all result in the same final state. How-
ever, for our purposes it suffices to consider a single se-
rial order.
Definition Suppose that a database is created by running
a set of transactions that commit in the order T1, . . . , Tn.
The resulting database instance is correct if and only if
it is equivalent to one obtained by running transactions
T1, . . . , Tn in serial order on an initially empty database.
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Theorem 4.1. Suppose that no crashes or state-
reversion attacks occur. If a TLOW audit succeeds, then
the current DB instance is correct.
Proof. Because the audit succeeded, the auditor’s sanity
check of L (routine SanityCheck) must have succeeded.
Thus there is at most one COMMIT record for each
transaction. In addition, the timestamps for the COM-
MIT records in L must be in strictly increasing order.
This serial order T1, . . . , Tn is the one used to construct
the correct final state.
Consider the case where no previous audits have taken
place. The audit has succeeded, so the auditor’s hash
over the new tuples in L is the same as the hash over the
current DB state. We must prove that the auditor’s hash
over the new tuples in L is also the same as a hash of the
tuples obtained by running T1, . . . , Tn serially on an ini-
tially empty database. If these two hashes are the same,
then by the properties of the auditor’s hash function, the
current DB state is equivalent to a correct final state.
Suppose that the two hashes disagree. In that case,
there must be one tuple in the correct final state that is
not included in the auditor’s hash over the new tuples in
L, or vice versa. Let us consider the first such tuple t,
in the sense that it was written by transaction Ti, and no
transaction Tj , where j < i in the serialization order,
wrote such a tuple.
First we consider the case where the extra tuple t is in
the correct final state, but is not included in the auditor’s
hash over the new tuples in L. Consider what happens
when t’s transaction Ti (which we will call T for sim-
plicity) runs.
We trust the TLOW DBMS to carry out its functions in
its usual manner, including concurrency control. Since T
is the first transaction in serialization order to exhibit be-
havior that differs from that needed to obtain the correct
final state, and no state-reversion attacks occur, all the
transactions that committed before T must have written
the correct final values for the tuples that they inserted.
Otherwise the audit would have failed, due to a mismatch
between the tampered final state and the new tuples in L.
Further, because the DBMS carries out its concurrency
control functions correctly, it would have aborted T if
T had read any dirty values written by transactions that
eventually aborted. Since T was not aborted, this prob-
lem did not occur. This means that T must have read
correct values when it ran under the TLOW architecture,
because no state-reversion attacks occur while it runs, so
any tampering of the values it reads would have caused
the audit to fail. More precisely, T will read the same val-
ues as if T1, . . . , Ti = T were run one by one against an
initially empty database, with no attacks. Since T reads
the same values in both configurations, it will write the
same final values in both cases.3
Recall that we trust the TLOW DBMS code to carry
out insertions of new tuples in its usual manner. Thus
when T writes a tuple, that write is promptly reflected
in a dirty page in the DBMS buffer pool. Recall that we
also trust the DBMS buffers; in other words, Mala does
not tamper with the dirty pages while they sit in memory.
Thus, since t is a final value written by T , the DBMS put
a copy of a dirty page p containing t (or, depending on
how the DBMS performs logging, a copy of the dirty
parts of p, which must include t) on L before it wrote a
COMMIT record for T to L. Since T committed, that
part of L has reached disk by the time of the audit. Thus
the auditor will eventually scan p in L. (If only the dirty
parts of p are logged, the argument will be the same; so
we argue only the case where p itself is logged.)
When the auditor parses p, she sees either t or else
a tuple t′ that is identical to t except that it contains a
transaction ID T instead of T ’s timestamp ts. Next we
argue that the auditor will include the new tuple t/t′ for
T in her hash appropriately.
Suppose that the auditor does not add t/t′ to her data
structure for T . The only possible reason is that she
thinks that T has already committed. However, this can-
not be the case, because the auditor’s initial sanity check
determined that there was only one COMMIT record for
T . Further, according to the threat model, Mala does not
regret any tuple that is not yet committed, so Mala has
no reason to add a spurious COMMIT record for T to
L. We conclude that the auditor does add the key and
content for t/t′ to her data structure for T .
Because T does eventually commit, the auditor will
eventually scan a COMMIT record for T and hash all
of the tuples she has collected for T . The only possible
reason for t to be omitted from the hash is if the auditor
thinks that t is not a final value for T . In other words, she
thinks that T overwrites the value of t, exclusive of key
and timestamp. For the auditor to reach this conclusion,
there must have been a page image p′ that follows p onL,
precedes the COMMIT record for T , and contains a new
value for t (exclusive of the timestamp). Either Mala ap-
pended this image to L; or p went to disk, was tampered
there, was read back in, was dirtied anew, and was sent to
L again before T committed; or Mala created this image
by tampering with the buffer pool. We trust the buffer
pool, so this last attack is not possible. Let us consider
Mala’s motivation for carrying out one of the two other
attacks.
According to the threat model, the first possible moti-
vation is that Mala overwrote t because she regretted its
existence. However, she cannot regret the existence of t
3We assume here that T does not make calls to the outside environ-
ment, e.g., to read the time of day, other than to obtain the transaction’s
timestamp.
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before t is even committed, so she cannot have overwrit-
ten t for this reason before T committed. If she over-
wrote t after T committed, the auditor will have ignored
the overwrite when computing her hash, and included t
in her hash.
Second, at some point (call it time 0 on the WORM
server) Mala may have regretted the absence of some
other tuple t′ from the database and wanted to create a
backdated version of t′ by tampering with t. For this at-
tack to be effective, she must set back the DBMS server
clock to the time she would like t′ to be stamped with,
which must be at least one regret interval in the past.
(Note that this precludes a zero regret interval.) So that
t′ will be included in the auditor’s hash, Mala must get
a copy of t′ onto L, followed by a COMMIT record for
t′. If Mala acts as fast as possible, she can write the
COMMIT record for t′ immediately after time 0 on the
WORM server, with timestamp at most −r.
We trust the WORM storage server’s clock, because
Mala cannot tamper with it. Thus we trust the create
time and last write time for each file of L. Consider the
file f of L in use at time 0 on the WORM server, i.e., at
the point where Mala appends the page containing t′ and
the new COMMIT record. The create time of f must be
greater than −r/2, because it is still in use after time 0,
when Mala appends material to L. The timestamp of the
COMMIT record she appends is at most −r. Thus the
auditor’s sanity check will determine that the clocks on
the WORM server and (presumably) the DBMS server
differ by more than r/2 time units, and the audit will fail.
Since the audit did not fail, Mala cannot have mounted
such an attack. We conclude that the auditor will include
the correct value for t in her hash in this case.
The LDA approach is also subject to DBMS clock
tampering attacks, and its authors proposed to thwart
them by flushing the LDA compliance log buffers to disk
every r time units. The argument given above shows that
the LDA approach needs to flush those buffers every r/2
time units, instead. TLOW also avoids the LDA require-
ment that the DBMS and WORM storage server clocks
be roughly synchronized.
Another possibility is that Mala’s goal in inserting the
page image containing t′ that overwrote t was to cause
a side effect other than getting rid of t or backdating t′.
In that case, her goal must have been to get rid of some
other tuple s that was committed to the database at least
one regret interval ago, or to create some backdated tuple
s′ that is not currently in the database. No matter what
integrity constraints may be present in a transaction-time
database, no insertion can cause the creation of another
backdated tuple s′; as argued above, Mala cannot back-
date new tuples by more than one regret interval. On the
other hand, the insertion of t′ can cause another tuple s
to be deleted, if certain integrity constraints are present.
However, s will not be shredded. It will still be visible
to temporal queries. If Mala wants to get rid of s, she
will have to overwrite it or shred it, and the bogus over-
write of t by t′ does not help her toward that goal. The
final possibility is that Mala wrote the record for reasons
outside the scope of our threat model, in which case it is
also outside the scope of this theorem. We conclude that
the auditor does include t in her hash.
However, perhaps the auditor does not use the right
timestamp for t in her hash. As discussed earlier, the
auditor must find T ’s timestamp and substitute it into t
before computing the hash. She will find T ’s correct
timestamp in L, because we trust the DBMS to insert
new tuples correctly, we trust that Mala will not be able
to alter the timestamp in the buffer pool, and because the
auditor’sL sanity check found only one timestamp for T .
We conclude that the auditor does include t in her hash
correctly, a contradiction of our initial assumption that t
is excluded from her hash of the tuples inserted by T .
Now suppose that the extra tuple t is in the current DB
state, but is not in the equivalent correct final state. Since
the audit succeeded, t must have been included in the au-
ditor’s hash. Suppose that the copy of t used in the hash
came from a page image p on L, and p said that transac-
tion T wrote t. Because t was included in the auditor’s
hash, a COMMIT record for T must follow p on L as
well; otherwise T would not have been included in the
serialization order. Since the auditor performed a sanity
check on L, L must have only one COMMIT record for
T . Thus T qualifies as a “submitted transaction” in the
theorem statement, and the correct final state must have
included an invocation of T .4 Suppose that T = Ti in the
serialization order. The COMMIT record for T tells the
auditor what timestamp to use for t in her hash. Because
the auditor included t in her hash, it must appear on L
before the COMMIT record for T .
One possibility is that t is not in the equivalent cor-
rect final state because t was subsequently overwritten
by T . In that case, the auditor did not recognize that the
value for t on p was subsequently overwritten, and there-
fore included it in her hash. If the auditor overlooked
the subsequent value, then one possibility is that it was
not logged. However, this cannot happen, because we
assume that the DBMS operates correctly and Mala does
not tamper with the buffer pool.
A second possibility is that the subsequent value for T
appears too late on L and the auditor ignored it. In this
case, since we trust the DBMS to log pages correctly,
Mala must have inserted a spurious COMMIT record for
T . But then the auditor’s sanity check would have ob-
served two COMMIT records for T , and the audit would
4Note that without transaction integrity, T may include tuple inser-
tions that originate from Mala, in addition to those intended by T ’s
author.
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have failed, which it did not.
A third possibility is that Mala altered the database
state to contain t′ instead of t, and did not tamper with
L. Since the audit did not fail, Mala must have reverted
the page contents to their correct content before the audit.
However, this violates our assumption that Mala did not
carry out any state reversion attacks.
The only remaining possible reason that t is not in
the equivalent correct final state is that Mala inserted the
page image p for t on L. According to our threat model,
one possible reason for her behavior is that she wants to
insert a copy of t that is backdated by at least one regret
interval. However, the arguments given earlier show that
although she can tamper with the DBMS server’s clock,
she cannot backdate t by an entire regret interval with-
out detection. Another possibility is that t is overwriting
another value written by T , and Mala regrets the exis-
tence of that other value. However, Mala cannot regret
that other value, because it is not even committed yet.
Further, the argument given earlier shows that Mala can-
not turn back the DBMS clock far enough to successfully
overwrite t. A third possibility is that the insertion of t
will cause a side effect that meets Mala’s needs, by creat-
ing a tuple s that is backdated by at least one regret inter-
val, or by overwriting or shredding an existing tuple. As
described earlier, these side effects are impossible. Nor
can the spurious page image on L cause any ongoing or
previous transaction to abort, as the DBMS will not be
aware of the page image. We conclude that if Mala in-
serted such a page image, it was for reasons outside the
scope of our threat model.
Now consider the case where k previous audits have
occurred. Since audits are rare and major events, the au-
ditor can consult a trusted third party to see who was
responsible for the previous audit, and obtain the pub-
lic key of that auditor. With that public key, the auditor
can check the digital signature on the snapshot from the
previous audit, to verify that the snapshot is the one pro-
duced by the previous auditor. Since the snapshot, its
associated hash H , and the corresponding digital signa-
ture are on WORM storage in non-appendable files, none
of them can have been tampered with since they were
created. We trust the previous auditor to have correctly
created the snapshot and its audit hash Ho, and correctly
signed them. Thus the hash value stored with the previ-
ous snapshot is trustworthy. The auditor adds this hash
value to that computed over L. The remainder of the ar-
gument proceeds as for the first audit.
Theorem 4.2. Suppose that no state reversion attacks
occur, the organization provides transaction integrity,
and the auditor knows when each DBMS crash and shut-
down occurred and when normal transaction processing
started or resumed. If the audit succeeds, then the final
database state is equivalent to a correct final state.
Proof. We begin by presenting our high-level argument.
Let (T1, . . . , Tn) be the serialization order of the trans-
actions that committed since the last audit.
1. Because the audit succeeded, the auditor’s hash HL
over the transaction log files (omitting all R files)
is the same as the auditor’s hash Hfinal over the
actual final database state.
2. Suppose that we remove all the R files and the
records of any crashes, creating a no-crash ver-
sion of the logs. Then we run the auditor’s rou-
tine again. The auditor will compute the same hash
value Hfinal as before; call it HnoCrashLogs. Let
the no-crash final database state be the result of re-
playing the no-crash version of the logs. Assume for
the moment that the no-crash final database state is
the same as the final database state.
3. Since HnoCrashLogs is equal to the hash over the
no-crash final database state, the previous theo-
rem tells us that the no-crash final database state is
equivalent to that obtained by running the transac-
tions in S one by one, starting with the snapshot
produced by the previous audit.
4. Therefore the actual final database state is also
equivalent to that obtained by running transactions
T1, . . . , Tn one by one on the snapshot produced by
the previous audit. The theorem follows.
We have two remaining tasks: extracting the serialization
order T1, . . . , Tn and showing that a DBMS run that pro-
duced the no-crash version of the logs would have pro-
duced the actual final database state. We start by arguing
that the auditor extracts the serialization order correctly.
The auditor’s trusted information about
crash/shutdown and start /restart times allows her
to distinguish between L and R files, and discard any L
files that Mala may have created before the DBMS re-
sumed admitting new transactions. The auditor’s sanity
check has eliminated the possibility that any pair of L or
R files have overlapping life spans, or that any L files
were written to after a DBMS crash occurred but before
the subsequent recovery was completed. The auditor’s
sanity checks ensure Mala cannot have appended a
COMMIT record to any L file after a crash, and each
transaction has at most one COMMIT record. Thus the
L files do correctly show which transactions committed
and what pages they intended to write. As argued in the
previous theorem, the auditor will correctly extract the
sequence of COMMIT records from the L files, giving
her the equivalent serial ordering T1, . . . , Ti, . . . , Tn that
should be used to construct the correct final state.
Because the organization provides transaction in-
tegrity and Mala cannot have appended a COMMIT
record to an L file after a crash, all new tuples inserted
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by committed transactions were already on the log at the
time of the crash. As argued in the proof of the previous
theorem, the auditor will be able to extract those page
writes from the log correctly.
As discussed in the proof of the previous theorem, the
timestamps for transactions that committed within r/2
time units before a crash, according to their timestamps
on L, cannot differ from the corresponding WORM
server clock times by more than r time units.
Our next task is to argue that the no-crash version of
the logs could have produced the actual final database
state.
Let N be the no-crash version of the sequence of log
files, obtained by omitting all theR files based on the list
of crash/restart times. If the auditor accepted the original
set of log files without demanding forensic analysis, then
she will also accept N , as its sanity checks are a subset
of her original checks. Further, N writes the same final
tuple values as did the original runs that produced the ac-
tual final database state. The final tuple values written by
committed transactions are all that the auditor considers
when computing the hash over a database state. Assum-
ing that N could have been produced by an actual run,
then the previous theorem applies, telling us that the ac-
tual final database state is equivalent to that produced by
running T1, . . . , Tn serially in isolation on the snapshot
produced by the previous audit.
Finally, N could have been produced by an actual
run, as follows. Suppose that during the original run, at
each point where a crash occurred, instead the applica-
tions chose to abort their active transactions. If they did
not submit any new transactions until the time when the
DBMS came back up in the original run, then they could
have produced exactly the log N and the corresponding
final state.
If the auditor does not know when crashes occurred or
normal transaction processing resumed, then in the worst
case, the auditor may not recognize that any crashes have
occurred. The previous proof shows us what vulnerabil-
ities this introduces. Suppose a crash occurred at time
k. The set of vulnerable transactions is all those who had
started but not committed or aborted by time k. Mala can
choose whether to commit or abort each of them, and can
add additional writes to those that do commit.
5 Speeding up Audits with an Audit Helper
(AH)
Since audits are likely to be infrequent (e.g., once a year
or once a quarter), Lmay be extremely long and the audit
may be very slow. Our experiments presented in Section
7 verify this concern; for example, if our implementation
of TLOW runs a 10-warehouse TPC-C around the clock
for one year on the platform we used, then the audit will
take 10 days to process the log, plus the time to scan the
current database instance and verify its integrity. The in-
stance is likely to be quite large too, typically containing
seven years worth of versions of tuples.
To reduce these costs, we propose to do real-time in-
cremental auditing. This approach relies on an audit
helper (AH) process that can run on the DBMS server
platform (or on its own host, as long as its host and the
WORM server keep their clocks within r/2 time units of
each other). The helper readsL from WORM as fast asL
is written, finds the new tuples on L and hashes them in
exactly the same manner as an auditor would, and period-
ically writes the hashes to H in a special form discussed
later. The auditor can only trust helper hashes that reach
WORM within r time units after their transaction com-
mitted. As shown by experiments presented later, AH
has a very small impact on transaction throughput, be-
cause the log pages it reads are generally already in the
file system cache on the DBMS server or WORM server,
its computational overhead is quite small, and it imposes
only a tiny write overhead on the WORM server.
If a helper’s hash of a new tuple reaches WORM
more than r time units after that tuple is committed,
then the auditor cannot use that late hash and must re-
compute it. To help the auditor to identify late hashes,
the helper flushes H to WORM every r/2 time units.
More precisely, every r/2 time units, the helper appends
(hv tid1 ptr1 · · · tidn ptrn) to H and flushes it to a
new file on WORM, where tid1 · · · tidn are the IDs of
the transactions whose COMMIT records the helper has
scanned since the last flush and whose commit times-
tamps are within the last r/2 time units; ptr1 · · · ptrn
point to the COMMIT records in L for tid1 · · · tidn, re-
spectively; and hv is the hash of the new tuples inserted
by tid1 · · · tidn (and nothing else). After flushing, the
helper continues to scan L.
Mala cannot overwrite an existing tuple version by at-
tacking AH, but she can insert a backdated tuple t as fol-
lows. First, she tampers with the database instance so
that it includes t. Then she kills AH and replaces it by
a tampered audit helper, TAH. Suppose that transaction
T commits while TAH is running. TAH hashes the tu-
ples inserted by T plus t, and writes the result out to H.
The auditor will not recognize that the hash value for T
includes the backdated tuple t.
Mala’s attack can easily be detected by hashing the tu-
ples in L and comparing them to the hashes stored in L,
but the whole point of AH is to entirely avoid scanning
L. The chance of catching an attack by spot-checking a
randomly selected H files is very low. Thus to counter
this attack, we require AH to sign its H files using a key
that Mala cannot easily obtain. For this purpose, AH may
rely on an inexpensive TPM on the server where it runs,
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plus the ability to prove that it is a legitimate copy of an
audit helper (i.e., certified code). The TPM can contain
a key seed, known to the auditor, that is used to gener-
ate a secret key k for each time epoch using a one-way
hash function. AH can use a cryptographic hash func-
tion hk to compute hk(k, i), where i is the tuple hashes
that AH is writing to H. Then AH can append hk(k, i)
to H. The auditor knows the seed, which allows her to
generate k quickly. As she scans H, she looks for and
verifies the signatures (keyed hashes) that she encoun-
ters. TPMs do not provide perfect security for keying
material or for guaranteeing that only certified code is
running on a platform, but they raise the bar sufficiently
high to deter almost all system administrators.
If the helper crashes, the DBMS can continue run-
ning, and vice versa. When the DBMS comes back up, it
will start a new transaction log file, and the helper must
watch for this file to appear. When the helper comes
back up, it goes to the current file for L, i.e., the log
file started after the most recent DBMS boot. The helper
starts scanning from the current end of L, but ignores
tuples from logged pages whose PrevLSN is non-null,
unless the helper already has started a data structure for
that transaction. This way, the helper will only hash new
tuples from transactions that made their first write after
the helper restarted.
At audit time, the auditor must perform its usual san-
ity checks on the create and last write times of each L
file, and perform sanity checks on the H files as well.
Any H files written more than r/2 time units after the
DBMS crashed, and before it came up again, must be
discarded. Next, the auditor examines eachH file to find
its pointers to COMMIT records in L. (If there is no H
file for a particular interval, or the file fails this sanity
check, then the auditor must perform traditional auditing
for all transactions active during that period; we do not
discuss that task further.) The auditor must also make
sure that the COMMIT records that H points to are le-
gitimate, i.e., not inserted in L by Mala. This involves a
sanity check that the last write time (resp. create time) on
the L file containing each COMMIT record is less than
r/2 time units after (resp. before) the transaction’s times-
tamp recorded in the COMMIT record. As its third sanity
check, the auditor compares the last write time of the H
file on the WORM server to the earliest commit time for
any transaction ID listed in that file. If the difference is
more than r time units, the auditor must redo the hash
of the new tuples for those transactions. If the auditor
only needs to compute the hashes for a few transactions,
it can quickly find the relevant information for each of
them by following the LastLSN pointers for a transaction
backwards through L, starting from its COMMIT record.
After computing a hash value over the new tuples of all
the transactions for which it could not use an H file, the
auditor then adds the hash values from all the H files
that it found to be trustworthy, to arrive at the final hash
value for all of L. The auditor goes on to compute the
hashes over the current instance and previous snapshot,
and compares them as under the TLOW approach.
One can also use an audit helper process to check that
transactions read untampered data. We do not discuss
the details here, but the essence is the same as for AH:
move the auditor’s tasks for hash-page-on-read [16] to
the audit helper, and ensure that if the audit helper falls
behind the DBMS, the next audit will detect the delay
and will regenerate those hashes by scanning L.
The other major cost of auditing is the time to scan and
hash the current instance, which may become very large
over the years. We adopt LDA’s approach of migrating
old versions of tuples to WORM, and using time-split
B+-trees to split nodes so that the index pages for histor-
ical tuples lie primarily on WORM [16]. Once the next
audit has been completed, the pages on WORM can be
excluded from subsequent audits, greatly reducing their
cost. Another important advantage of migrating histori-
cal tuples to WORM is that the production database stays
small and compact, so that transaction processing per-
formance is not compromised by poor locality of current
versions of tuples.
6 Basic Forensic Analysis
The TLOW architecture and AH allow an auditor or
DBA to quickly determine whether the database instance
has been tampered with. However, for forensic inves-
tigations, it is often important to pinpoint the particular
tuples and times when the tampering occurred. We pro-
pose a solution to this problem.
When the audit fails, the forensic analysis process
steps through each table of the previous snapshot, com-
puting a new relation Hashes that contains (t.k,H(t))
for each tuple t with key k and cryptographic hash
H(t). Then the forensic analysis process steps through
L, finding each new tuple t′ and computing its hash
H(t′). The forensic analysis finds the key of t′ in
Hashes and changes the value H(t) stored there to be
ADD HASH(H(t), H(t′)). To make this fast, we can
build a B+-tree over the key attributes of Hashes and
use it to find each key as needed. Alternatively, we can
scan the log and compute all the new (t′.k,H(t′)) values,
sort them on k, and then do a zigzag join of them with
Hashes, updating the content of Hashes each time we
find a matching tuple.
Finally, the forensic analysis considers each tuple in
the current instance of the database, checking whether
its hash is what is stored for its key k in Hashes, and
marking the key k in Hashes as having been matched
with a key from the current instance. This process can
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Figure 3: TPC-C run times with unmodified Berkeley
DB, TLOW with regret interval 120 seconds, TLOW
with regret interval 30 seconds, and TLOW with AH and
a 30-second regret interval. As the overheads are less
than 1% for TLOW-120, less than 2% for TLOW-30, and
less than 4% with TLOW-30-AH, the curves almost co-
incide.
be sped up by using any available B+-trees for the two
relations. A mismatch in hash values indicates tamper-
ing, as does the absence of k in Hashes. At the end of
the pass over the current instance, if any keys in Hashes
have not been matched, that also indicates tampering. If
audit failures are common, then after repair and a suc-
cessful re-audit, the auditor can sign Hashes and store
it on WORM for use during the next audit.
7 Empirical Evaluation
To evaluate TLOW performance, we used the Shore
implementation of the industry standard TPC-C bench-
mark, ported to run on Berkeley DB version 4.7.25. The
DBMS was hosted in a machine with a Pentium dual
core 2.8 GHz processor, 512KB L2 cache, 4GB RAM,
and a 1TB hard disk. We simulated the WORM server
using a Pentium 2.8 GHz single core processor, 512KB
L2 cache, with a portion of its local disks exported as an
NFS volume. The DBMS mounted the WORM volume
over NFS, and stored the logs there. We ran AH on the
DBMS server. AH can be run on a separate server and
still take advantage of the warm WORM server cache,
but its overhead is so small that we left it on the DBMS
server. All the machines ran on Linux with kernel ver-
sion 2.6.11.
Our experiments ran 100,000 TPC-C transactions with
a 512 MB DBMS cache and a 10 warehouse TPC-C
configuration, resulting in a 2.5 GB database. We en-
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Figure 4: Audit time for the transaction log. Without
any optimizations, the log file audit time is approxi-
mately 100 seconds for 100K TPC-C transactions (2.7%
of transaction run time). With AH, the audit time drops
to between 0.8 seconds (100% H files valid, 0.02% of
transaction time) and 35 seconds (50%H files valid).
sured that the file system caches on the WORM and
DBMS servers were cold at the beginning of each run.
For runs without support for term-immutability, we used
the DBMS’s default maximum log file size of 10MB.
When this size is reached, the DBMS starts a new log
file. For 100,000 TPC-C transactions in 10 warehouses,
Berkeley DB created a total of 232 log files, of size
2.32 GB. On average, the log creation rate was ap-
prox. 38 MB/minute. For runs with support for term-
immutability, every r/2 seconds we called a function
supplied by Berkeley DB to flush and close the log file,
and start a new log file.
We implemented the audit helper AH as a separate
process that polls the log directory on the WORM server
for files. When AH finds a new log file, it hashes the
file’s newly inserted tuples appropriately, and flushes the
results to anH log file on WORM every r/2 seconds.
TLOW and AH TPC-C performance. We measured
TPC-C performance with regret intervals r of 30 sec-
onds and 2 minutes, with and without an audit helper
AH. The resulting TPC-C run times are shown in Fig-
ure 3. With a 2 minute regret interval, we have less than
1% overhead in all cases up to 100,000 transactions. For
a 30 second regret interval, the overhead is always less
than 2%. In general, the faster the DBMS generates log
files, the lower the overhead will be. The presence of
AH added less than 1.5% overhead, and AH processed
L files much faster than the DBMS generated them. As
mentioned earlier, if policy-makers require detection of
all state reversion attacks, the TPC-C overhead on our
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platform is approximately 10% [16]; we have not exper-
imented with ways to potentially reduce this cost further.
If policy-makers require probabilistic detection of state
reversion attacks through frequent internal audits, this
adds no overhead to the run times reported in Figure 3.
Audit tasks include the tuple completeness check,
the check of the hashes of pages read by transactions
(if policy-makers do not accept a probabilistic internal
check for state-reversion attacks), and the integrity check
on the current DB instance. The latter check should be
performed at regular intervals in any case. The expen-
sive steps of the tuple completeness check are hashing
the new tuples in L and in the current DB instance. Fig-
ure 4 shows that the new tuples of 100K TPC-C trans-
actions on L can be hashed in less than a second when
H files are available for all transactions; if noH files are
available, the hashing takes just over 100 seconds. As
AH has no trouble keeping up with the DBMS, we ex-
pect that after a year, H files will be available for almost
all committed transactions. This implies that the time to
scan H files from one year of non-stop TPC-C on our
platform will be just under two hours.
To generate the hash of the current instance, we pro-
pose to piggyback on the DB instance integrity check
utility. This utility has to fetch and parse each page of the
DB, so the additional cost of hashing each tuple and re-
porting the final hash is miniscule. On our platform, the
page fetches are the major expense; the additional cost
of parsing and hashing fetched pages after 100K transac-
tions, given that the pages were already in the file system
cache, was 8 seconds. Thus the time to parse and hash a
year of TPC-C tuple versions is less than 20 hours on our
platform, given that the pages were already being fetched
from disk for another purpose, such as backup. As an in-
stance containing 7 years of tuple versions will be very
large, the WORM migration feature discussed in Section
3 should be used to move old versions to WORM, so that
tuple versions migrated to WORM before the last audit
do not need to be scanned and hashed. If old tuple ver-
sions are migrated to WORM once a month and omitted
from subsequent informal audits, then the cost of parsing
and hashing the remaining tuples will be quite modest.
We conclude that in practice, the tuple completeness
check will be so affordable that the organization should
be able to perform an informal audit whenever it runs
a routine integrity check on the portion of the current
database instance that is not on WORM, or even at every
backup.
8 Related Work
Researchers have looked into several aspects of compli-
ance for database data. We have already described LDA
[16], which offers a different approach to the same prob-
lem that TLOW addresses. Another recent innovation is
a framework for auditing changes to a database while re-
specting retention policies [14]. This approach focuses
on policy based redaction and removal of sensitive in-
formation from the database and its history, and han-
dling the uncertainties in answering audit queries from
the resulting incomplete table and history. The TLOW
approach for ensuring that database contents are term-
immutable can be combined with this framework, so that
one can support audit queries over sensitive information
while guaranteeing that tampering with database con-
tents or history, even by system administrators, can be
detected.
Researchers have addressed the related problem of
writing and enforcing tuple retention and shredding poli-
cies, expressed as restrictions on the operations that can
be performed on views [3]. Their approach relies on the
DBMS to enforce the policies. TLOW can augment this
by protecting the database contents against tampering by
adversaries who gain superuser access, or even insiders
with incentives to tamper the data. For example, suppose
that a skilled DBA opens the database file with a file ed-
itor or an uncertified copy of the DBMS, and removes
or alters some of its content. TLOW can identify this
tampering at the next audit.
Tamperproof database audit logs are another direction
of research. In one scheme [20], the transactional data
is cryptographically hashed by the DBMS, signed peri-
odically by a trusted third-party notary, and then stored
in the database. Later, a validator process verifies the
current database state using the certified hashes. If tam-
pering is detected, a forensic analyzer helps to identify
when and where the database was tampered. One draw-
back of this approach is that newly added content can be
tampered until the next notarization, without subsequent
detection. As the notaries are trusted third parties, it is
hard to shrink the notarization interval below, say, once
a day. The TLOW approach shrinks this window of vul-
nerability to a minute or less, with minimal impact on
transaction throughput.
Effective shredding of expired data is required by
some regulations and is a corporate goal in many other
situations. Researchers have proposed techniques for
database scrubbing, i.e., removal of lingering traces of
deleted tuples [21]. Such techniques can be used in con-
junction with TLOW to provide more effective support
for shredding of expired tuples.
Many researchers have tackled the security problems
associated with outsourced database and file manage-
ment [7, 8, 15, 18, 24], and cryptographic file systems
[6, 10, 11, 17]. The high-level goals of outsourcing re-
search are for the data owner to receive integrity guaran-
tees for databases/files stored on untrusted servers, and
correctness guarantees for DBMS/file system responses
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to user requests. Outsourcing research assumes that the
data owner is trustworthy and will not tamper with the
data, but the storage server is untrustworthy. In data re-
tention scenarios, the WORM storage server is trusted,
but we do not trust the data owner. The owner may have
powerful incentives to tamper with the data, and may
have administrator access to the database and its phys-
ical platform.
Data retention is just one important aspect of
Sarbanes-Oxley compliance. Agrawal et al. [2] describe
how databases can play an important role in helping
companies comply with many other aspects of Sarbanes-
Oxley, and present several open research problems re-
lated to this role.
9 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed TLOW, a high-performance
approach to supporting term-immutable databases for
regulatory compliance. TLOW stores the current
database instance on traditional storage and the transac-
tion log on a low-cost WORM storage server; the trans-
action log is segmented in a manner that allows an audi-
tor to detect a variety of attacks, including clock tamper-
ing. Our proof of correctness for TLOW sheds light on
a variety of potential attacks, including one that causes
trouble for a previously proposed approach.
We implemented a prototype of the TLOW architec-
ture on top of Berkeley DB, by adding a process that
forces it to switch log files twice during each regret
interval, i.e., the maximum allowable period before a
tuple must become term-immutable. Our experiments
with TPC-C show that TLOW supports a regret inter-
val as small as 2 minutes with less than 1% slowdown
in transaction throughput. In other words, 2 minutes af-
ter a transaction commits a new tuple, the tuple becomes
term-immutable, in the sense that we will be able to de-
tect any subsequent attempts to tamper with it. This is a
5-fold performance improvement over the previous state
of the art, and shows that TLOW is practical and efficient
for OLTP applications that can employ a transaction-time
approach, i.e., where one can keep all past versions of tu-
ples.
Data tampering will be detected when the database
is audited, which may take place once a year. Tam-
pering is indicated by a mismatch between the current
database instance, the contents of the transaction log, and
the database instance that was in place during the previ-
ous audit. To detect tampering quickly, we use the incre-
mental commutative hash function ADD HASH that was
used for that purpose in previous work. To make audits
fast, we introduced an audit helper (AH) function that
hashes new tuples on the transaction log as fast as they
are written to disk, and saves the hashes on WORM. The
auditor can use the hashes computed and saved by AH
whenever the auditor determines that the tuple hashes
reached WORM storage within one regret interval after
the tuples were committed; otherwise, the auditor must
hash those portions of the transaction log on its own. Our
experiments show that AH has no significant impact on
TPC-C performance, and speeds up audits enormously,
reducing the cost of hashing the transaction log by a fac-
tor of 100. We also show how to reduce the cost of hash-
ing the current database instance to just a few seconds,
by piggybacking the task onto a periodic check of the in-
tegrity of the database contents. Finally, we show how to
perform a tuple-level forensic analysis when tampering
is detected.
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Appendix: Auditor Pseudocode
Audit (T , CrashList,DBold, DBnew)
1: Let T be the sequence of transaction log files, in create
time order.
2: Let CrashList be the trusted list of crash and recovery
events.
3: Let DBold be the snapshot from the last audit, and let
DBnew be the current DB instance.
{Extract the recovery log files R, and no-crash version of
transaction log files L from T }
4: (L,R)← Extract Recovery Log(T , CrashList)
{Perform global sanity checks on transaction log files}
5: if (GlobalSanityCheck(L, R,CrashList) == AU-
DIT FAIL) then
6: return AUDIT FAIL
7: end if
{Is each individual log file okay?}
8: if (SanityCheck(L, DBold, DBnew) == AUDIT FAIL)
then
9: return AUDIT FAIL
10: end if
11: logHash← HashTransactionLog(L)
12: oldDBHash← ComputeDbHash(DBold)
13: newDBHash← ComputeDbHash(DBnew)
14: computedHash ←
ADD HASH(logHash, oldDBHash)
15: if (newDBHash == computedHash) then
16: return AUDIT PASS
17: else
18: return AUDIT FAIL
19: end if
GlobalSanityCheck (L, R,
CrashList)
1: if (R contains anything other than recovery operations)
then
2: return AUDIT FAIL
3: end if
4: for all (c ∈ CrashList) do
5: {c.Start is the time that the crash occurred, and c.End
is the time that the DBMS resumed normal operation}
6: for all (L ∈ L) do
7: {Let L.ct and L.mt be the creation and last write
times of L, respectively. Reject log files written or
created while DBMS is down}
8: if ((c.End > L.mt > c.Start) OR (c.Start <
L.ct < c.End)) then
9: return AUDIT FAIL
10: end if
11: end for
12: end for
13: if (the lifespans of any two log files in L overlap) then
14: return AUDIT FAIL
15: end if
16: return AUDIT PASS
SanityCheck (L, DBold, DBnew)
1: for all (L ∈ L) do
2: if (L has two COMMIT records for the same transac-
tion) then
3: return AUDIT FAIL
4: end if
5: if (L has a COMMIT record timestamp before the create
time or after the last write time of L) then
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6: return AUDIT FAIL
7: end if
8: if (COMMIT record timestamps in L do not appear in
chronological order) then
9: return AUDIT FAIL
10: end if
11: if (lastModificationT ime(L) > r/2 +
createT ime(L)) then
12: return AUDIT FAIL
13: end if
14: end for
15: if (The WORM and DBMS servers’ clocks were more than
r/2 time units apart at any point since the last audit) then
16: return AUDIT FAIL
17: end if
{Is DBold okay?}
18: if ((The signature onDBold is not from the correct auditor)
OR (The signature on DBold does not match its contents)
) then
19: return AUDIT FAIL
20: end if
{Is the DB final state clean? Use the DBMS’s native in-
tegrity checker to verify that each data page is properly or-
ganized, indexes and other metadata are set up properly,
and crash recovery has been run if the last shutdown was
due to a crash.}
21: if (the native DBMS integrity check on the database fails)
then
22: return AUDIT FAIL
23: end if
24: return AUDIT PASS
HashTransactionLog (L)
1: {Initialize list of ongoing, committed and previously seen
transactions}
2: Txn← {};Seen← {}; Committed← {}
3: log hash← 0
4: for all (L ∈ L) do
5: {For each log file, scan records sequentially}
6: for all (record ∈ L) do
7: if (the record lists a tuple to be inserted) then
8: txnID ← get txn ID(record)
9: if ((txnID ∈ Committed) OR
get timeStamp(record) < last audit time))
then
10: continue
11: end if
12: if (txnID /∈ Seen) then
13: Seen← Seen ∪ txnID
14: Txn[txnID]← new TXN STRUCT ()
15: Txn[txnID].add(record)
16: end if
17: end if
18: if (record is a COMMIT record) then
19: Committed← Committed ∪ txnID
20: txnHash← Hash TXN(Txn[txnID])
21: log hash ←
ADD HASH(log hash, txnHash)
22: end if
23: end for
24: end for
25: return log hash
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